环境公益诉讼激励机制的法律构造——以传统民事诉讼与环境公益诉讼的当事人结构差异为视角

The Legal Construction of Incentive Mechanism in Public Interest Environmental Litigation: From the Perspective of the Litigant Structural Difference between Traditional Civil Litigation and Public Interest Environmental Litigation

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归属学者:

陈亮

作者:

陈亮

摘要:

当事人结构对诉讼激励的法律构造有着决定性影响。诉讼当事人结构有表层结构和深层结构之分。在民事诉讼中,表层结构以当事人之间的对抗为其基本特征,决定着诉讼收益的有无;深层结构则表现为当事人在功能上的"三位一体",决定着诉讼收益的归属。二者共同作用,使得民事诉讼的激励机制内嵌于诉讼制度本身,激励着当事人的全部诉讼行为。环境公益诉讼当事人结构的差异,不仅表现在表层结构上从对抗走向协作,而且表现在深层结构上"三位一体"的破裂,从而形成社会公众、环境公益诉讼原告以及原告律师三者之间的双层委托代理关系,环境公益诉讼的激励困境由此产生。双层委托代理关系中高昂代理成本的存在决定了原告律师应成为环境公益诉讼的激励对象,而"败诉方负担规则"因同时具备正诉激励、滥诉预防与行为矫正三重功能而成为激励律师的最佳举措。

语种:

中文

出版日期:

2016-07-15

学科:

诉讼法学

收录:

北大核心期刊; 中国科技核心期刊; CSSCI

提交日期

2018-01-11

引用参考

陈亮. 环境公益诉讼激励机制的法律构造——以传统民事诉讼与环境公益诉讼的当事人结构差异为视角[J]. 现代法学,2016(04):133-143.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 环境公益诉讼激励机制的法律构造——以传统民事诉讼与环境公益诉讼的当事人结构差异为视角
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 陈亮
  • dc.contributor.author
  • CHEN Liang;School of Applied Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学应用法学院;
  • dc.publisher
  • 现代法学
  • dc.publisher
  • Modern Law Science
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2016
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 04
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.38;No.206
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 133-143
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2016-07-15
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 当事人结构;;委托代理理论;;代理成本;;败诉方负担
  • dc.subject
  • litigant structure;;agency theory;;cost of agency;;burden of fee on losing party
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 当事人结构对诉讼激励的法律构造有着决定性影响。诉讼当事人结构有表层结构和深层结构之分。在民事诉讼中,表层结构以当事人之间的对抗为其基本特征,决定着诉讼收益的有无;深层结构则表现为当事人在功能上的"三位一体",决定着诉讼收益的归属。二者共同作用,使得民事诉讼的激励机制内嵌于诉讼制度本身,激励着当事人的全部诉讼行为。环境公益诉讼当事人结构的差异,不仅表现在表层结构上从对抗走向协作,而且表现在深层结构上"三位一体"的破裂,从而形成社会公众、环境公益诉讼原告以及原告律师三者之间的双层委托代理关系,环境公益诉讼的激励困境由此产生。双层委托代理关系中高昂代理成本的存在决定了原告律师应成为环境公益诉讼的激励对象,而"败诉方负担规则"因同时具备正诉激励、滥诉预防与行为矫正三重功能而成为激励律师的最佳举措。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Litigant structure has decisive influence upon the legal framing of litigation incentive,which consists of the surface structure and the inner structure. In civil litigation,the surface structure is characterized with adverseness,which determines the outcome of the litigation; the inner structure is characterized with the functional trinity,which determines the ownership of the outcome of the litigation. The coexistence of the surface structure and the inner structure embeds the incentive mechanism in the litigation itself and encourages the litigants throughout the whole process. The change in the litigant structure in public interest environmental litigation is reflected both in the surface structure and the inner structure and creates a two-tier principal-agent relationship among the public,the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney,which leads to the incentive dilemma in public interest environmental litigation. The high costs in public interest environmental litigation shall make the plaintiff's attorney the one to be motivated,while the "burden of fee shall be on the losing party"rule is the best way to motivate the plaintiff's attorney for its three functions: encouraging meritorious litigation,preventing frivolous litigation and correcting behaviors.
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 2012年度国家社科基金西部项目“委托代理理论视角下我国环境执法制度完善研究”(12SKC11)
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 50-1020/D
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1001-2397
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 1.147
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D925.1
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