The Effect of Independent Director Reputation Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China

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归属学者:

余磊 ; 王琦

作者:

Yu, L ; Wang, DJ ; Wang, Q

摘要:

This paper examines the effect of independent director reputation incentives on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using an unbalanced panel of 3765 Chinese-listed firms between 2009 and 2014, this study suggests that independent director reputation incentives improve CSR. Furthermore, it is found that this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, our results also show that the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR is moderated by firm size, and this effect is much stronger in relatively larger firms. Together, these results suggest that reputation is an effective mechanism that can motivate independent directors to fulfill their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially in non-SOEs and relatively larger firms. We add new insights to the research on the topics of independent director system, protection of the stakeholders' interests, and CSR enhancement.

语种:

英文

出版日期:

2018-09

学科:

环境科学与工程

收录:

SSCI; SCI(E)

提交日期

2018-12-06

引用参考

Yu, L; Wang, DJ; Wang, Q. The Effect of Independent Director Reputation Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China[J]. SUSTAINABILITY,2018(9):.

  • dc.title
  • The Effect of Independent Director Reputation Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Yu, L; Wang, DJ; Wang, Q
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Business Sch, 301 Baosheng Ave, Chongqing 401120, Peoples R China;Aalborg Univ, Dept Business & Management, Room 52,Fibigerstr 4, DK-9220 Aalborg, Denmark
  • dc.publisher
  • SUSTAINABILITY
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2018
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 9
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • 10
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2018-09
  • dc.language.iso
  • 英文
  • dc.subject
  • independent director reputation incentives; corporate social responsibility; stakeholders' interests; property ownership; firm size
  • dc.description.abstract
  • This paper examines the effect of independent director reputation incentives on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using an unbalanced panel of 3765 Chinese-listed firms between 2009 and 2014, this study suggests that independent director reputation incentives improve CSR. Furthermore, it is found that this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, our results also show that the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR is moderated by firm size, and this effect is much stronger in relatively larger firms. Together, these results suggest that reputation is an effective mechanism that can motivate independent directors to fulfill their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially in non-SOEs and relatively larger firms. We add new insights to the research on the topics of independent director system, protection of the stakeholders' interests, and CSR enhancement.
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • Doctor Project Planning of Chongqing Social Science [2015BS017]; Young Teachers Academic Innovation Team Project of Southwest University of Political Science Law of China [2016XZCXTD-10]; Project of Southwest University of Political Science and Law of China [2015XZQN-06]; Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission [KJ1701006]; National Natural Science Foundation of China [71501162, 71302032]
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 2071-1050
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