“不判决,无法律”——格雷法律渊源理论研究

"No judgment, no legal"—Study on Gray’s Legal Sources Theory

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归属院系:

行政法学院

作者:

关海军

导师:

姚荣茂

导师单位:

行政法学院

学位:

硕士

语种:

其他

关键词:

格雷;法律;法律渊源;法律约束力

摘要:

在法律现实主义中,法律渊源是一个非常重要的概念。从某种意义上说,正是对这一概念独特的理解,使得法律现实现实主义形成了自己独特的法律观念。作为美国法律现实现实主义奠基人之一的约翰﹒奇普曼﹒格雷,在其《法律的性质与渊源》的著作中,别具一格地提出了法律渊源理论,而此书也被视为法律现实主义的经典之作。约翰﹒奇普曼﹒格雷是美国著名法学家,他提出的法律渊源理论极具影响力。在他的《法律的性质与渊源》的著作中,格雷提出了法律与法律渊源的区分。“不判决、无法律”是格雷法概念的核心,并由此认为制定法、司法先例、习惯、专家意见、道德原则等并不是法律,而是法律渊源。《法律的性质与渊源》详细地解析了格雷的法概念以及法律渊源理论,这是法律与法律渊源进行区分的过程,但是在这个过程中格雷只是简单地对法律与法律渊源进行了区分,他并未说明对法律与法律渊源进行区分的根据,也没有明确地指出法律渊源有没有法律约束力。本文以《法律的性质与渊源》为分析对象,试图探讨格雷的法律渊源理论,这对于理解和把握格雷的法律观,乃至整个现实主义法学都具有重要的理论意义。本文除引言、结语外,共分四个部分:第一部分,对格雷的法律与法律渊源进行区分。从格雷对当时存在的三个法律定义的评析,即对奥斯丁的法律是主权者的命令、萨维尼的法律是民众的意识以及法官是法律的发现者的评析,格雷得出自己的法概念,认为法律是法院为确定当事人权利义务而发布的一般规则,而先前存在的制定法、司法先例、习惯、专家意见、道德原则等只是法律渊源。然后是对格雷法律与法律渊源的界定,通过澄清几个容易对格雷法概念的误解进一步加深对格雷法律观念的认识。最后,探讨一下格雷对法律与法律渊源区分的根据。第二部分,详细梳理格雷法律渊源的种类。格雷所说的法律渊源只包含了五个种类,而且在格雷看来不是说只要符合这五个种类就是法律渊源,它们要作为法律渊源的力量还需要一定的条件。此外,格雷所谓的法律渊源之间不存在等级隶属关系,它们处在同等的地位,而且在法官司法裁判中它们往往是不加区分的混合在一起的。第三部分,主要探讨格雷的法律渊源是否具有法律约束力。为了更为清晰地把握这一问题,主要是结合格雷的言论进行剖析,得出格雷对法律渊源是否具有法律约束力上处在模糊的立场。然后结合法律现实主义的观点进一步了解格雷的法律渊源,并得出后来的法律现实主义在这个问题上出现分歧的必然性。第四部分,格雷法律渊源理论的难以证成招来了许多法学家的批评,其中以凯尔森和哈特的批评为代表。凯尔森以他的规范等级体系、哈特以他的社会规则理论来对格雷的法律学说进行批评的。他们批评的共同点是认为格雷的法概念过于狭隘,法律渊源其实的法律的一部分。在这一部分,笔者也从《法律的性质与渊源》的全篇对格雷的法律渊源理论进行简单的评析。本文的研究结论是格雷所谓的法律与法律渊源是有区别的,法律与法律渊源有着严格的区分,并且这种区分也是有根据的,他的法律渊源理论有着极大的影响力。但是他的理论学说也存在着种种缺陷,最大的缺陷就是在对法律渊源是否具有法律约束力上存在着模糊的立场。格雷自身理论的难以证成以及凯尔森、哈特对格雷法律渊源理论的批评更加凸显了格雷理论的缺陷与不足。因此,只有在不破坏格雷法律实证主义的内核和维护格雷法概念原貌的前提下,扩大格雷法概念的外延,格雷的法律渊源理论才能经得起考验。

学科:

法学理论

提交日期

2019-04-11

引用参考

关海军. “不判决,无法律”——格雷法律渊源理论研究[D]. 西南政法大学,2013.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • “不判决,无法律”——格雷法律渊源理论研究
  • dc.title
  • "No judgment, no legal"—Study on Gray’s Legal Sources Theory
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • 20100301010088
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 关海军
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 行政法学院
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 硕士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学硕士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2013
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 姚荣茂
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 行政法学院
  • dc.language.iso
  • 其他
  • dc.subject
  • 格雷;法律;法律渊源;法律约束力
  • dc.subject
  • Gray;law;sources of the law;legally binding
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 在法律现实主义中,法律渊源是一个非常重要的概念。从某种意义上说,正是对这一概念独特的理解,使得法律现实现实主义形成了自己独特的法律观念。作为美国法律现实现实主义奠基人之一的约翰﹒奇普曼﹒格雷,在其《法律的性质与渊源》的著作中,别具一格地提出了法律渊源理论,而此书也被视为法律现实主义的经典之作。约翰﹒奇普曼﹒格雷是美国著名法学家,他提出的法律渊源理论极具影响力。在他的《法律的性质与渊源》的著作中,格雷提出了法律与法律渊源的区分。“不判决、无法律”是格雷法概念的核心,并由此认为制定法、司法先例、习惯、专家意见、道德原则等并不是法律,而是法律渊源。《法律的性质与渊源》详细地解析了格雷的法概念以及法律渊源理论,这是法律与法律渊源进行区分的过程,但是在这个过程中格雷只是简单地对法律与法律渊源进行了区分,他并未说明对法律与法律渊源进行区分的根据,也没有明确地指出法律渊源有没有法律约束力。本文以《法律的性质与渊源》为分析对象,试图探讨格雷的法律渊源理论,这对于理解和把握格雷的法律观,乃至整个现实主义法学都具有重要的理论意义。本文除引言、结语外,共分四个部分:第一部分,对格雷的法律与法律渊源进行区分。从格雷对当时存在的三个法律定义的评析,即对奥斯丁的法律是主权者的命令、萨维尼的法律是民众的意识以及法官是法律的发现者的评析,格雷得出自己的法概念,认为法律是法院为确定当事人权利义务而发布的一般规则,而先前存在的制定法、司法先例、习惯、专家意见、道德原则等只是法律渊源。然后是对格雷法律与法律渊源的界定,通过澄清几个容易对格雷法概念的误解进一步加深对格雷法律观念的认识。最后,探讨一下格雷对法律与法律渊源区分的根据。第二部分,详细梳理格雷法律渊源的种类。格雷所说的法律渊源只包含了五个种类,而且在格雷看来不是说只要符合这五个种类就是法律渊源,它们要作为法律渊源的力量还需要一定的条件。此外,格雷所谓的法律渊源之间不存在等级隶属关系,它们处在同等的地位,而且在法官司法裁判中它们往往是不加区分的混合在一起的。第三部分,主要探讨格雷的法律渊源是否具有法律约束力。为了更为清晰地把握这一问题,主要是结合格雷的言论进行剖析,得出格雷对法律渊源是否具有法律约束力上处在模糊的立场。然后结合法律现实主义的观点进一步了解格雷的法律渊源,并得出后来的法律现实主义在这个问题上出现分歧的必然性。第四部分,格雷法律渊源理论的难以证成招来了许多法学家的批评,其中以凯尔森和哈特的批评为代表。凯尔森以他的规范等级体系、哈特以他的社会规则理论来对格雷的法律学说进行批评的。他们批评的共同点是认为格雷的法概念过于狭隘,法律渊源其实的法律的一部分。在这一部分,笔者也从《法律的性质与渊源》的全篇对格雷的法律渊源理论进行简单的评析。本文的研究结论是格雷所谓的法律与法律渊源是有区别的,法律与法律渊源有着严格的区分,并且这种区分也是有根据的,他的法律渊源理论有着极大的影响力。但是他的理论学说也存在着种种缺陷,最大的缺陷就是在对法律渊源是否具有法律约束力上存在着模糊的立场。格雷自身理论的难以证成以及凯尔森、哈特对格雷法律渊源理论的批评更加凸显了格雷理论的缺陷与不足。因此,只有在不破坏格雷法律实证主义的内核和维护格雷法概念原貌的前提下,扩大格雷法概念的外延,格雷的法律渊源理论才能经得起考验。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • The sources of Law is a very important concept in Legal Realism. in a sense, it is just because the existence of the unique understanding, Legal Realism can form its own special legal concept. John Chipman Gray, one of the founders of Legal Realism from America, put forward the theory of Sources of Law uniquely in his writing " The Nature and Sources of the Law ", which is regarded as a classics of Legal Realism .As a famous American jurist, John Chipman Gray's theory of sources of law is highly influential. In this book, Gray made ??a distinction between law and the sources of law. "No judgment, no legal" is the core concept of Gray law, thus the statute, judicial precedent, habit, expert advice, moral principles are not law, but the sources of law. This book also parses Gray's theory of law concept and the source of law in detail, as well as the process of distinguishing law from the sources of law. But in the process, Gray just made a simple distinction between the law and the sources of the laws with not any basis. He did not explain clearly whether the sources of law had any binding force. By analyzing " The nature and sources of the law " in detail, this thesis attempts to explore Gray's theory of the sources of law in a new vision. It is very important for the understanding and grasp of the legal concept of Gray. It also has theoretical significance for the whole Legal Realism. Besides the introduction and conclusion, this thesis is divided into the following four parts:The first part distinguishes Gray law and the sources of law. By analyzing and commenting on the existing three legal definitions at that time, namely Austen's law is the command of the sovereign, the Savigny law is national consciousness and the judge is the discoverer of the law, Gray drew his own law concept. He suggested that law is a general rule of law which is released by the court to determine a party's rights and obligations. The previously existing statutes, judicial precedents, habits, expert advice, moral principles etc., are only the source of law. Subsequently, we further deepen the understanding of concept of Gray law by distinguishing law from the sources of law and clarifying some easy-understanding of the concept of Gray law. Finally, we discuss the basis of the distinction between law and the sources of law. The second part combines different types of the sources of law in detail. The sources of law contains only five species according to Gray, and they are not sufficient without some certain conditions to be the sources of law. Additionally, the so-called source of law by Gray does not exist any level of affiliation, They are in the same status, and they are often not indiscriminate mixing together in the administration of justice of judge . The third part, also the most important part of this article, focuses on whether the sources of law has any legal binding. In order to grasp this problem more clearly, We first analyze the concept combining with Gray's remarks, drawing that Gray stands on the ambiguous stance about the problem whether the sources of law has any legal binding. Then we learn more about the sources of law by Gray combining with the view of legal realism, obtaining the inevitability of difference of the latter legal realism on this problem. In the fourth part, we introduce some different opinions that disagree with Gray's theory of sources of law. It is mainly because the difficulty of justifying that a lot of judges criticize his viewpoint, Kelsen and Hart are the most representatives, according to the specification of level system and the theory of social rules respectively. The common denominator of their criticisms is that Gray's Law concept is too narrow. The sources of law is the law itself. We will make a simple analysis and comment on the theory of the sources of law from the whole content of " The nature and sources of the law ". Through the analysis, we conclude that the so-called law and sources of law are different from each other. They have strict distinctions with basis. Gray's theory of sources of law has a great influence, however, there are also a lot of shortcomings. The biggest flaw is ambiguous stance on the problem about its legal binding. As Gray’s theory is difficult to prove, Kelsen and Hart's criticisms make the flaws and shortcomings of his theory more prominent. Thus, Gray's theory of sources of law stands the test only by expand the extension of the concept without destruction to the its maintenance of legal positivism, and keeping its original premise.
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D90
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2026-03-12
  • dc.date.oralDefense
  • 2013-05-25
  • dc.relation.relatedpublications
  • 引 言... 1一、法律与法律渊源的区分... 4(一)对几种法律概念的评析... 4(二)法律与法律渊源的界定... 8(三)法律与法律渊源区分的根据... 10二、法律渊源的种类... 15(一)制定法... 15(二)司法先例... 17(三)专家意见... 19(四)习惯... 20(五)道德原则... 21三、法律渊源有无法律约束力... 23(一)立场上的模糊性... 23(二)格雷法律渊源理论与法律现实主义的困境... 25四、格雷法律渊源理论的评说... 27(一)凯尔森的批评... 27(二)哈特的批评... 28(三)笔者的评析... 30结  语... 32参考文献... 34致  谢... 37
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