资本市场开放、产品市场竞争与审计师选择——基于双重制度压力视角的实证研究

Capital Market Liberalization, Product Market Competition and Auditor Selection——Empirical research based from the perspective of dual institutional pressure

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归属学者：

郑国洪

作者：

陈丽蓉 ;邓利彬 ; 郑国洪1 ;姜梦园 ;陈正威

摘要：

资本市场开放对上市公司监管与信息披露提出了更高要求,对审计师需求亦相应变化。鉴于此,以"沪深港通"交易试点为背景,本文实证检验资本市场开放与上市公司审计师选择相关性以及产品市场竞争的治理效应。研究发现:资本市场开放显著提高上市公司选择高质量审计师的意愿,相较于高竞争行业和高市场竞争地位的上市公司,低竞争行业和低市场竞争地位公司审计师选择对资本市场开放的敏感性更强。结果表明,产品市场竞争加强了资本市场开放对选择高质量审计师意愿,双重制度压力产生叠加效应。资本市场开放显著增强国有企业选择高质量审计师的可能性,使之信息披露更能适应市场竞争需要,促使经济实现协调、健康、有序的发展,确保供给侧结构性改革成功。

出版日期：

2021-01-28

学科：

金融学; 会计学; 产业经济学

收录：

北大核心期刊; CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期：

2021-03-24

引用参考：

陈丽蓉;邓利彬;郑国洪;姜梦园;陈正威. 资本市场开放、产品市场竞争与审计师选择——基于双重制度压力视角的实证研究[J]. 审计研究,2021(01):83-93.

全文附件授权许可：

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 资本市场开放、产品市场竞争与审计师选择——基于双重制度压力视角的实证研究
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 陈丽蓉;邓利彬;郑国洪;姜梦园;陈正威
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Chen Lirong;Deng Libin
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学审计与法治研究中心
  • dc.publisher
  • 审计研究
  • dc.publisher
  • Auditing Research
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2021
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 01
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • No.219
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 83-93
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2021-01-28
  • dc.subject
  • 资本市场开放;产品市场竞争;审计师选择
  • dc.subject
  • capital market liberalization;product market competition;auditor selection
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 资本市场开放对上市公司监管与信息披露提出了更高要求,对审计师需求亦相应变化。鉴于此,以"沪深港通"交易试点为背景,本文实证检验资本市场开放与上市公司审计师选择相关性以及产品市场竞争的治理效应。研究发现:资本市场开放显著提高上市公司选择高质量审计师的意愿,相较于高竞争行业和高市场竞争地位的上市公司,低竞争行业和低市场竞争地位公司审计师选择对资本市场开放的敏感性更强。结果表明,产品市场竞争加强了资本市场开放对选择高质量审计师意愿,双重制度压力产生叠加效应。资本市场开放显著增强国有企业选择高质量审计师的可能性,使之信息披露更能适应市场竞争需要,促使经济实现协调、健康、有序的发展,确保供给侧结构性改革成功。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • The opening of the capital market puts forward higher requirements on the supervision and information disclosure of listed companies, and the demand for auditors changes accordingly. In view of this, with the"Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect"trading pilot as the background, we empirically test the relevance of capital market liberalization and auditor selection of listed companies, and the governance effect of product market competition. The research shows that the capital market liberalization significantly improves the willingness of listed companies to choose high-quality auditors, and compared with companies in highly competitive industries with strong market competitiveness, the auditor selection in lowly competitive industries with weak market competitiveness are more sensitive to capital market liberalization. The results show that product market competition increases the willingness of capital market liberalization to select high-quality auditors, and the dual system pressure has a superimposed effect. The capital market liberalization significantly increases the likelihood of state-owned enterprises choosing high-quality auditors, making their information disclosure more adaptive for market competition, promoting coordinated, healthy and orderly economic development, and ensuring the success of supply-side structural reforms.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 71872154
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家社会科学基金项目“分析师估值模型研究”(项目批准号：71872154)的资助
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 11-1024/F
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1002-4239
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 2.811
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • F832.51;F239.4;F273.2
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