媒体关注对大股东违规减持有监督作用吗？

Does Media Coverage Supervise Large Shareholders' Illegal Reduction?

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归属学者：

吴先聪 ; 郑国洪

归属院系：

商学院（监察审计学院）

作者：

吴先聪1,2 ; 郑国洪1,2

摘要：

本文以2012—2018年上市公司作为原始样本,手工搜集大股东违规减持的数据,用PSM方法对实验组样本(违规减持组)匹配控制组样本(正常减持组),用Python软件获取事件窗口期财经媒体所有报道和负面报道数据,实证检验了媒体关注对上市公司大股东违规减持的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司受到的媒体关注度越高,大股东违规减持的可能性越低,而且媒体负面报道效果更显著,但是媒体报道对控股大股东和非控股大股东违规减持的监督效果没有明显差异。论文进一步研究了媒体关注对大股东减持约束作用的中介路径和调节机制,结果表明,在不成熟的资本市场,媒体很难通过提高公司内部控制有效性来约束大股东违规减持行为,但是可以依靠行政介入实现其公司治理功能。本文利用事件研究方法提取窗口期内媒体报道量的数据,对其研究能更准确地识别媒体关注对大股东违规减持行为的监督效果。同时,从微观和宏观视角探讨媒体发挥治理作用的中介效应和调节效应。研究结果为财经媒体缓解公司第二类代理问题提供了理论及现实依据。

出版日期：

2021-09-24

学科：

应用经济学; 新闻传播学; 工商管理

收录：

北大核心期刊; CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期：

2021-11-25

引用参考：

吴先聪;郑国洪. 媒体关注对大股东违规减持有监督作用吗？[J]. 外国经济与管理,2021(11):86-103.

全文附件授权许可：

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 媒体关注对大股东违规减持有监督作用吗？
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 吴先聪;郑国洪
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Wu Xiancong;Zheng Guohong;School of Business, Southwest University of Political Science & Law;Research Center for Audit and Rule of Law, Southwest University of Political Science & Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学商学院;西南政法大学审计与法治研究中心
  • dc.contributor.corresponding
  • 吴先聪
  • dc.publisher
  • 外国经济与管理
  • dc.publisher
  • Foreign Economics & Management
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2021
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 11
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.43;No.513
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 86-103
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2021-09-24
  • dc.subject
  • 媒体监督;大股东;违规减持;内部控制;减持规定
  • dc.subject
  • media supervision;large shareholders;illegal reduction;internal control;reduction regulations
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 本文以2012—2018年上市公司作为原始样本,手工搜集大股东违规减持的数据,用PSM方法对实验组样本(违规减持组)匹配控制组样本(正常减持组),用Python软件获取事件窗口期财经媒体所有报道和负面报道数据,实证检验了媒体关注对上市公司大股东违规减持的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司受到的媒体关注度越高,大股东违规减持的可能性越低,而且媒体负面报道效果更显著,但是媒体报道对控股大股东和非控股大股东违规减持的监督效果没有明显差异。论文进一步研究了媒体关注对大股东减持约束作用的中介路径和调节机制,结果表明,在不成熟的资本市场,媒体很难通过提高公司内部控制有效性来约束大股东违规减持行为,但是可以依靠行政介入实现其公司治理功能。本文利用事件研究方法提取窗口期内媒体报道量的数据,对其研究能更准确地识别媒体关注对大股东违规减持行为的监督效果。同时,从微观和宏观视角探讨媒体发挥治理作用的中介效应和调节效应。研究结果为财经媒体缓解公司第二类代理问题提供了理论及现实依据。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Taking the listed companies from 2012 to 2018 as the original sample, this paper manually collects the data of illegal reduction of large shareholders, and uses the PSM method to match the samples of the experimental group(illegal reduction group)with the samples of the control group(regular reduction group). Then, it empirically tests the impact of media coverage on the illegal reduction of large shareholders of listed companies. The results show that the more the media coverage of listed companies, the lower the possibility of illegal reduction of large shareholders, and the effect of negative coverage is more significant. But there is no significant difference in the supervision effect of media coverage on the illegal reduction of controlling and non-controlling large shareholders. In further research, this paper discusses the intermediary path and regulation mechanism of media coverage on the restriction of large shareholders' reduction. The results show that in the immature capital market, it is difficult for the media to restrict the illegal reduction of large shareholders by improving the effectiveness of corporate internal control, but it can rely on administrative intervention to realize its corporate governance function.The main contributions are as follows: Firstly, this paper studies the impact of media coverage on the illegal reduction of large shareholders, so as to provide a new perspective for the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors. Secondly, this paper uses the PSM method to obtain two group paired samples, and then uses the event study to extract the reporting times of financial media coverage in the long and short window periods. Based on this, it analyzes the impact mechanism and effect of the "soft constraint" of media daily supervision on the reduction behavior of large shareholders.Because the data used in regression analysis is "clean", which eliminates interference factors and endogenous problems as much as possible, it can more accurately identify the supervision effect of media coverage on the illegal reduction of large shareholders. Thirdly, based on the reputation mechanism and administrative intervention mechanism, this paper discusses the intermediary effect and regulation effect of media governance from the micro and macro perspectives, and deeply analyzes the path and mechanism of media governance. The results provide a theoretical and practical basis for the financial media to alleviate the Second Agency Problem, which not only enriches the relevant research results of the role of media coverage on corporate governance, but also provides a reference for regulatory authorities to supervise the illegal reduction of large shareholders and protect the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 19YJA630089;71802169;19BGL059
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 教育部人文社科规划项目（19YJA630089）;国家自然科学基金项目（71802169）;国家社会科学基金项目（19BGL059）
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家自然科学基金;国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 31-1063/F
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1001-4950
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 1.988
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • F832.51;G206
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